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The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996: Another
Congressional Hurdle for the Courts
SONIA CHEN*
INTRODUCTION
The development of U.S. immigration law' has largely been influenced by
the tension between the plenary power doctrine and constitutional norms.
Some scholars have further suggested that this tension has resulted in the
creation of "phantom constitutional norms" in the context of immigration
laws.2 The plenary power doctrine "declares that Congress and the executive
branch have broad and often exclusive authority over immigration decisions.
Accordingly, courts should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion,
entertain constitutional challenges to decisions about which aliens should be
admitted or expelled."3 Despite immense criticism of the well-established
doctrine,4 courts have continued to be highly deferential in this area of law.'
This is not to say that courts have declined to engage in any substantive
constitutional analysis of immigration matters.6 Rather than address the issue
directly, they have devised creative methods of incorporating constitutional
norms through the interpretation of immigration statutes.7 The result is "a less
$ J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., Music, 1998,
Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Professor John Scanlan for his invaluable comments and
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1. The term is generally used to refer to "the body of law governing the admission and expulsion of
aliens[,]" which is distinct from the "general law of aliens' rights and obligations.. " Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990).
2. Id. at 549.
3. Id. at 547.
4. "This doctrine has dominated immigration law since the Court adopted it almost one hundred
years ago in rejecting constitutional objections to Congress' first immigration statutes." Id.
5. Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause. 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 126 (1998).
6. Id.
7. Motomura, supra note 1, at 549. See also David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus
and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481,2484 (1998)
(arguing that "[tlhe courts have adopted a 'jurisprudence of avoidance' in addressing both congressional
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coherent body of case law" governed by phantom constitutional norms that
lack predictability.8
In this Note, I will trace how the judiciary has recognized, despite
congressional attempts to maintain exclusive control over immigration law,
constitutional rights in lawful permanent residents. Specifically, I will outline
the effects of the 1996 congressional reforms to the Immigration and
Nationality Act,9 and on the previously recognized rights of lawful permanent
residents as advanced byKwongHai Chew v. Colding, " Rosenberg v. Fleuti, "
and Landon v. Plasencia. 12 In Part I, I provide a background of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Chew and Fleuti, and the role of the plenary power
doctrine. In Part I, I discuss the realization of these phantom constitutional
norms in Landon.3 In Part III, I introduce the changes to U.S. immigration
law promulgated by the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 4 and I examine those
sections that are applicable to the admission and expulsion of lawful
permanent residents of the United States. In Part IV, I consider the
implications of the post-IIRIRA Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision
In re Jesus Collado-Munoz, " and U.S. Court of Appeals decision Richardson
v. Reno16 as they relate to the constitutional rights of lawful permanent
residents recognized by the Court in Fleuti. In Part V, I analyze the future
ramifications of IIRIRA for lawful permanent residents and the judiciary's
role in shaping immigration law despite the plenary power doctrine.
control ofjurisdiction in general and the constitutionality of immigration statutes in particular").
8. Morawetz, supra note 5, at 124.
9. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.).
10. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
11. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
12. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
13. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 578.
14. Defense Department Appropriations Act 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A. and 18 U.S.C.A.). The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is Division C of that Act.
15. Interim Decision No. 3333, 1997 BIA LEXIS 40 (B.I.A. Dec. 18, 1997).
16. 162 F.3d 1338(1lth Cir. 1998).
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I. ROSENBERG v. FLEUTI AND THE PLENARY POWER DocTRINE
A. The "Entry" Question
Traditionally, the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution have guaranteed citizens of the United States due process
of law. The Fifth Amendment protects against federal action, in that "[n]o
person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' 7 Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."'"8 Although these procedural due process rights have been extended
to aliens, as well as citizens, in civil, criminal and administrative proceedings,
these rights have not been so readily applied to the right to enter the United
States.'9 Again, the power to admit aliens is rooted in the plenary power
doctrine, which grants Congress exclusive authority over decisions to admit
or not to admit persons into the United States and the power to create
immigration categories.20
Congress' exclusive power to define specific categories of aliens and to
limit the due process right of immigrants results in an aberrational application
of constitutional due process.2 ' In immigration law, procedural due process
claims occur primarily in deportation or exclusion hearings.2 More
specifically, differences in the degree of due process23 afforded an alien were
traditionally linked to the forum in which the decision was being adjudicated
and predicated on the definition of the word "entry."24 Depending whether
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
19. Robert D. Ahlgren, Procedural Due Process in Exclusion/Deportation, in 964 PUB. L. INST. 71,
73 (1996), available at 1996 WL 964 PLI/Corp 71. The Supreme Court has further held that the due
process clause does not prevent the federal government from adopting alienage classifications. Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976).
20. Ahlgren, supra note 19, at 73.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 74.
23. This Note is primarily focused on procedural due process, which is distinguishable from
substantive due process. For a discussion of the differences between substantive and procedural due
process in the immigration context, see id. at 73.
24. Id. at 75. See also Maureen O'Sullivan, The Cancellation of Deportation and Exclusion
Jurisprudence: What Can We Expect from Removal Proceedings?, in IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
LAW HANDBOOK-ADVANCED, reprinted in IMMIGRATION LAW-BASICS AND MORE, SD61 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
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there was an "entry" pursuant to INA § 101(a)(13), the alien would be placed
in either a deportation hearing or an exclusion hearing. Aliens who had
"entered" the United States were entitled to deportation hearings, which gave
them more procedural protection than the exclusion hearings gave to those
who had not "entered."
This distinction between types of entry and degrees of due process granted
dates back to an early Japanese immigrant case, Yamataya v. Fisher.25 In
Yamataya, the Court recognized that deportation procedures must conform to
the constitutional demands of the due process clause. 6 Nevertheless,
Yamataya's deportation was upheld based on the fact that she was never
formally inspected upon arrival, and thus, had not effectively "entered" the
United States.27 The Court further suggested a lower standard of due process
for those alleged to be present illegally in the United States.28 The most
significant difference between the two forums was in the allocation of the
burden of proof. In a deportation hearing, the burden of proof was on the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to prove deportability; in an
exclusion hearing, the burden was placed on the alien who faces exclusion to
prove admissibility.29
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the entry concept was its
applicability to returning aliens. Was an alien considered "entering" only on
his or her first entry, or did an alien "enter" on each return trip to the United
States? In United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,30 the Supreme Court
established the "re-entry doctrine." Under the Court's restrictive view, "the
word 'entry' ... includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into
the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one."31
Often, this judicial definition resulted in harsh consequences for lawfully
253, 255 (1999) (Under the 1996 reforms, Congress has replaced the term "entry" with "admission,"
shifting the focus to the definition of "admission."); Michael D. Patrick, The Diminution of the 'Fleuti'
Doctrine,219 N.Y.L.J. 54, Mar. 23, 1998, at 3. See also discussion infra Part III (introducing the changes
to immigration law through the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)).
25. 189 U.S. 86 (1903) ("The Japanese Immigrant Case").
26. Id. at 101.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Patrick, supra note 24, at 3. Furthermore, "[an alien subject to exclusion looses [sic] a great deal
of rights with regard to parole, bonding and relief from extended detention." Ahlgren, supra note 19, at 76.
30. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
31. Id.at425.
THE IRIRA: ANOTHER HURDLE FOR THE COURTS
admitted residents returning from brief trips. As a result, twenty years later,
the Court again analyzed the issue of returning resident aliens in Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding.32 This time, however, the Court recognized a heightened
level of protection for these individuals. Chew represented a shift from the
earlier, more rigid rule. Following this decision, Rosenberg v. Fleuti, which
allegedly reconfirmed the Chew Court's recognition of due process rights for
returning resident aliens, tested the outer limits of the Court's earlier holding.
B. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding and Rosenberg v. Fleuti: The Recognition
of Rights in Lawful Permanent Residents
1. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding
Chew, h Chinese national, was a lawful permanent resident of the United
States.33 He was returning from a voyage as a seaman on an American vessel
when he was detained on board by an order of the Attorney General.34 The
voyage had included several scheduled calls at foreign ports in the Far East.35
Upon arrival in New York, Chew was deemed excludable on the basis of
confidential information, the disclosure of which would be "prejudicial to the
public interest."36 Furthermore, because he was considered an alien seeking
"entry," he was detained without a hearing, without an opportunity to speak
on his own behalf, and without notice of the charges brought against him.37
Prior to his detainment, Chew was a resident of New York for five years and
was characterized as "having proved good moral character."3 Recognizing
the harsh effects of the rule set by Volpe, the Court reasoned that, although the
regulations permitted the exclusion of an arriving alien without a hearing,
Chew's status as a permanent resident alien had not changed by virtue of his
departure to sea.39 Thus, the regulation was inapplicable, and Chew was still
entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment.' To avoid confronting the
32. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
33. Id. at 592.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 594.
36. Id. at 595.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 592.
39. Id. at 600.
40. Id. at 599.
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constitutional issue directly, thereby challenging Congress' plenary power, the
Court disguised its decision as a regulatory interpretation.
2. Rosenberg v. Fleuti
Ten years later, the Supreme Court would take the next logical step in the
recognition of due process rights for permanent resident aliens. This time, the
Court addressed the constitutional issue directly.
Any doubts that Chew recognized constitutional rights in the resident
alien returning from a brief trip abroad were dispelled by Rosenberg v.
Fleuti, where [the Court] described Chew as holding 'that the returning
resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the
charges underlying any attempt to exclude him.' 4'
Thus, Fleuti was a landmark decision not only because it represented a shift
from the earlier, more rigid rule of "entry," but also because it was "one
milestone in the transition from phantom to real of a norm recognizing a
returning resident alien's stake."42 Up to this point, courts reached results
favorable to aliens, not by using constitutional norms,4 but "by interpreting
statutes, regulations, or other forms of subconstitutional immigration law.""
Likewise, the Court in Fleuti used statutory interpretation to redefine "entry"
to avoid the application of the term to a permanent resident who had returned
to the United States from a temporary absence.45 Instead of confronting the
constitutional issue, the Court again used a phantom constitutional norm to
recognize procedural due process rights for the alien. This time, however,
41. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
820 (4th ed. 1998).
42. Motomura, supra note I, at 576.
43. Hiroshi Motomura notes two ways in which constitutional norms manifest themselves:
First, they govern expressly constitutional decisions; this is the intuitive definition
of 'constitutional.' Second, in a less intuitive but equally correct use of the term,
'constitutional' norms provide the background context that informs our
interpretation of statutes and other subconstitutional texts. This second use of
constitutional norms explains and reflects the time-honored canon that courts ought
to interpret statutes so as to avoid constitutional doubts.
Id. at 548-49.
44. Id. at 560.
45. Id. at 577.
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"the phantom norm of procedural due process for returning permanent
residents was close enough to the constitutional horizon that it is unsurprising
that the Court adopted it as a guide to statutory interpretation."'
Fleuti, a Swiss national, was originally admitted to the United States for
permanent residence in 1952."7 In August 1956, Fleuti left the United States
to visit Ensenada, Mexico for a couple of hours."' In April 1959, almost three
years after his return to the United States, the INS sought to deport him on the
ground that "he had been excludable at the time of his 1956 return as an alien
'afflicted with psychopathic personality' because he was allegedly
homosexual.49 Fleuti argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and
ambiguous as applied to his case because "homosexuality was not sufficiently
encompassed within the term 'psychopathic personality."' 5  Thus,
homosexuality could not be a ground for Fleuti's exclusion. The Court,
uncomfortable with the idea of determining the constitutionality of INA §
212(a)(4), focused its attention on the statutory definition of "entry."'"
Prior to the 1996 amendments, "entry" was defined as:
any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign
port or place or from an outlying possession, whether
voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful
permanent residence in the United States shall not be
regarded as making an entry into the United States for the
purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure ...
was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his
presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying
possession was not voluntary ......
The, question in Fleuti was whether Fleuti's short visit to Mexico was a
46. Id.
47. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449,450 (1963).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 450-51.
50. Id. at 45 1.
51. Id. at 451-52.
52. Id. at 452 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, §101(aXl3), 66 Stat. 167,
8 U.S.C.A. § i101(aXl3) (1952), amended by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(aXl3) (West 1998)).
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departure that was "not intended" within the meaning of the "entry"
exception.53 If the 1956 return was not an "entry," then Fleuti would not be
excludable, because "psychopathic personalities" were not a cause for
exclusion at the time of his entry in 1952."' On the contrary, if his 1956 return
was an "entry," Fleuti could be excludable if the Court determined that the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous." Using the
developments in case law leading up to the 1952 amendment of INA §
101 (a)(13) and the legislative history accompanying the revisions, the Court
reasoned that Congress intended to exclude returns from brief trips from the
new definition of "entry." The Court held that "an innocent, casual, and brief
excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders may not have been
'intended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore
may not subject him to the consequences of an 'entry' into the country on his
return. 56
The Fleuti Court further established a three part test to determine whether
the alien's departure was "innocent, casual, and brief' consistent with
congressional intent in formulating this "entry" exception. First, the Court
looked at the length of Fleuti's absence." Second, the Court looked at tle
purpose of his visit.58 Finally, the Court indicated that procuring travel
documents was relevant to whether Fleuti's trip was meaningfully interruptive
of his status as a permanent resident.59 Using these three factors, the Court
reached the conclusion that Fleuti's short visit to Mexico was "innocent,
casual, and brief' within the "entry" exception. Thus, he was not excludable
at the time of his 1956 return to the United States.
C. The Transition to Constitutional Norms in Immigration Law
Was the Court's construction of "entry" in Fleuti routine statutory
interpretation, or was something else motivating the Court? Hiroshi
Motomura suggests that the majority's opinion was largely motivated by
53. Id. at 452-53.
54. Id. at 453 n.2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 462.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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sympathy for the view that current immigration law failed to recognize that the
"interests at stake" were "momentous" 0 for the resident alien.6' Though
hidden under the guise of statutory analysis, this sympathy was in fact the
impetus for much of the Court's analysis. The majority was quick to conclude
that Congress' purpose in codifying the definition of "entry" was to ameliorate
the harsh effects of the previous rule62 and that Congress could not have
intended to exclude lawful permanent resident aliens upon return from a
departure of a "couple of hours."6a Contrary to what the Court would espouse
as clear Congressional intent, however, the views expressed by Congress were
far from being clear.
First, the Fleuti Court concluded that INA § 101 (a)(1 3) was representative
of Congress' rejection of the harsh results brought about by the rule
articulated by the majority in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith defining
"entry" as "any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United
States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one." Although
Congress recognized the judicial precedent of the "entry" doctrine by
providing for subsequent entries by a resident alien, the House and Senate
Committee Reports of the Eighty-Second Congress did not recommend a
broad exception for returning lawful permanent resident aliens.65 On the
contrary, the Reports specifically stated that "any coming of an alien from a
foreign port or place or an outlying possession into the United States is to be
considered an entry, whether voluntary or otherwise, unless the Attorney
General is satisfied that the departure of the alien... was unintentional or was
not voluntary."66 The language of the Reports, however, seemed to take a
secondary role to the more pressing humanitarian position embraced by the
Fleuti Court.
60.' Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 458 (quoting Di Pasquale v. Kamuth, 158 F.2d 878,879(2nd Cir. 1947) and
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
61. Motomura, supra note 1, at 577.
62. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 457-58.
63. Id. at 461.
64. Volpe, 289 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added).
65. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 457 n.8 (quoting H.R. Rap. No. 82-1365, at 32 (1952); S. REP. No. 82-1 137,
at 4 (1952)).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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Second, referring to Di Pasquale v. Karnuth67 and Delgadillo v.
Carmichael,68 the Fleuti Court noted that it should be guided by the more
general principles announced in the two decisions when determining the
breadth of the exceptions. 9 These cases establish that lawful permanent
resident aliens have a "vested interest" in their residence and that "the
continued enjoyment of [our] hospitality once granted, shall not be subject to
meaningless and irrational hazards."70 The Court in Delgadillo further
concluded that it could not have been Congress' intent to subject aliens whose
"stakes are indeed high and momentous" to such "fortuitous and capricious"
standards.7 However, the Court in Fleuti failed to acknowledge that these
two cases applied the law established in Volpe v. Smith and specifically
distinguished them on the grounds that "those were cases where the alien
plainly expected or planned to enter a foreign port or place," whereas in Di
Pasquale and Delgadillo, neither alien had a part in "selecting the foreign port
as his destination."72 Nevertheless, again emphasizing the harshness of the
consequences, the Court construed the "entry" exception to include Fleuti. 3
It is evident that the Court in Fleuti had to ignore clear legislative intent
to reach a more favorable "subconstitutional outcome."74 Some scholars
would argue that this method of using phantom norms to reach
subconstitutional standards in immigration law is advantageous. As David
Cole argues, the Court has adopted a very deferential review because
Congress finds solid support in the Constitution for its authority in
immigration matters.7 Through these favorable "subconstitutional outcomes,"
however, the Court has been able to impose "some limits on these otherwise
plenary powers, without directly challenging Congress."76 The Court has also
67. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
68. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
69. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 458-59.
70. Di Pasquale, 158 F.2d at 879.
71. Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 391.
72. Id. at 390. This was also one of the arguments articulated by the dissent in Fleuti. See Fleuti 374
U.S. at 465-68.
73. Motomura notes that Congress most likely intended the term "entry" to cover Fleuti's return based
on the limited number of exceptions granted and Congressional rejections to the specific amendments that
would have covered Fleuti. Motomura. supra note 1, at 578.
74. Id. at 577.
75. Cole, supra note 7, at 2508. The Court has only held two immigration statutes unconstitutional,
and invalidated two jurisdictional statutes for intruding on the judicial power. Id.
76. Id. at 2509.
THE IIRIRA: ANOTHER HURDLE FOR THE COURTS
created an opportunity for dialogue between the Court and Congress, while
preserving congressional authority as the Court's implicit legitimation as a
result of Congress' silence on certain matters." This is what Cole refers to as
the "strength of the 'jurisprudence of avoidance."' 78 Through statutory
interpretation or subconstitutional standards, the Court ensures aliens some
rights without directly challenging Congress' plenary powers."9 Judicial
decisions also facilitate discussions between Congress and the Court."0 When
the Court adopts a statutory construction to avoid constitutional problems, it
is advising Congress that "we don't believe you intended to do this, because
if you did it would raise grave constitutional questions."'" This leaves
Congress the option of redrafting the legislation to restate its intent more
clearly (bearing in mind the constitutional problems), or leaving the statute to
be interpreted by the courts.82
HI. LANDON Y. PLASENCIA
Following the decision in Fleuti, cases began to arise where certain
permanent residents with "high stakes" were still rendered excludable and
denied procedural due process. 3 Displeased with this somewhat incomplete
solution, the Court decided again to analyze the "entry" doctrine, not using
phantom constitutional norms, but by deciding the constitutionality of limiting
the due process rights of permanent resident aliens.8 4
In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court held that a permanent resident alien was
entitled to "invoke the Due Process Clause on returning to this country ."" In
using the rationale of previous cases, the Court acknowledged that "once an
alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. Cole also indicates some disadvantages to the "jurisprudence of avoidance" and notes that
whether it is justified depends on a balancing test, weighing the benefits and costs in particular settings.
See id. at 2510. See also Motomnura, supra note 1, at 600-13 (discussing the problems associated with
subconstitutional solutions while also recognizing its usefulness as a testing ground).
83. Motomura, supra note 1, at 578.
84. Id.
85. 459 U.S. 21, 32.
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with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly. 8 6
Thus, for the first time, permanent resident aliens found concrete support for
their due process claims not only in deportation hearings, but also in
exclusion hearings.8"
Maria Antoineta Plasencia, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United
States in 1970 as a permanent resident alien.88 Upon returning from Tijuana,
Mexico, on the evening of June 29, 1975, she and her husband, a United States
citizen, were detained at the border for aiding in the transportation of illegal
aliens into the United States. 9 At the exclusion hearing held the next day, the
immigration judge found that Plasencia and her husband "did 'knowingly and
for gain encourage, induce, assist, abet, or aid nonresident aliens' to enter or
try to enter the United States in violation of law."" He also ruled that the trip
was a "'meaningful departure' from the United States and that her return to
this country was therefore an 'entry' within the meaning of [INA] §
101(a)(13)."9' Thus, she was excludable. 92
On appeal, the Landon Court ruled that the INS properly proceeded in an
exclusion hearing to determine the entry issue and whether Plasencia was
excludable.9" The Court stated that: "The proceeding before that officer, the
exclusion hearing, is by statute 'the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining admissibility of a person to the United States .... "'9 Further, the
Court held that Plasencia's return was an "entry" within the meaning of the
statute and thus subject to exclusion.9" Unlike Fleuti's departure, Plasencia's
was "meaningfully interruptive" because the purpose of her trip was to
accomplish an objective that was itself contrary to some policy reflected in the
immigration laws.96
86. Id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).
87. Michelle Slayton, Comment, Interim Decision No. 3333: The Brief Casual, and Innocent
Conundrum, 33 NEW ENG. L REv. 1029, 1036 (1999).
88. Landon. 459 U.S. at 23.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 24.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 25.
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id. at 27 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 236(a), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1226(aX1 952), amended by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a) (West 1998)).
95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 29 (citing Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462).
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Despite the Court's determination that Plasencia was not entitled to a
deportation hearing, it nevertheless held that, under the circumstances, she
was entitled to due process. Referring to the holdings in Chew and Fleuti, the
Court noted that it had previously recognized due process rights for returning
resident aliens.97 It further acknowledged, however, that these rights were
recognized through "phantom norms."" Although the rationale behind the
previous decisions was one of constitutional law, the holdings were reached
under the guise of statutory interpretation.99 This time, the Court took the next
logical step to transform the "phantom constitutional norms" in Chew and
Fleuti into "real" constitutional norms in immigration law."
III. THE ENACTMENT OF IDRIRA
Although Landon seemed to make real the guarantees previously
articulated through phantom norms in Chew and Fleuti, returning permanent
resident aliens would soon be faced with another threat to their constitutional
rights. On September 30, 1996, U.S. President William J. Clinton signed
IIRIRA into law.'' Enacted to control illegal immigration, the bill was
criticized as "overstep[ping] duty" and "subvert[ing] cherished American
traditions... and the guarantee of equal rights to all."'0"
Specifically, IIRIRA made changes to immigration laws that would have
significant ramifications for lawful permanent resident aliens. First, IRIRA
combined deportation and exclusion into "removal proceedings" by replacing
the term "entry" with "admission." Second, the 1996 amendment rewrites
INA § 101 (a)(13) to list specific categories where lawful permanent residents
will not be regarded as seeking admission. 3 Third, IIRIRA expanded the
categories of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a), creating more stringent
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Motomura, supra note 1, at 580. Although the Court concluded that Plasencia was entitled to due
process, the exact standard was never articulated. Instead, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals
to determine whether the procedures afforded Plasencia actually comported with the due process clause.
Landon, 459 U.S. at 37.
10 1. Ellen G. Yost, Immigration and Nationality Law, 31 INT'L LAw. 589, 589 (1997).
102. 142 CONG. REc. S 1, 518 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (exhibit entered by Sen. Bob Graham
including portions of the Miami-Herald).
103. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 101(a) (13) (C), 8 U.S.C.A. § I 101(a) (13) (C)
(West 1998).
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admission standards for aliens seeking readmission. Additionally, the
definition of "aggravated felony" was expanded to prevent "undesirable"
persons from entering the United States. All the while, the effect of these
amendments has been harsh and, at times, inhumane. Furthermore, the forms
of discretionary relief available to those with criminal records have been
substantially limited. Finally, Congress has severely restricted the availability
of judicial review for immigration matters. All of these factors combined
considerably limit the rights of returning permanent resident aliens.
A. 'Removal Proceedings' and the New Focus on 'Admission'
Prior to URIRA, exclusion proceedings were governed by INA § 236 and
deportation proceedings were governed by INA § 242. IIRIRA collapses both
sections into INA § 240, which governs removal proceedings.'" In general,
removal proceedings are conducted by an immigration judge to determine the
inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.'05 The inadmissibility of an alien
is determined according to INA § 212(a), and the deportability of an alien is
determined according to INA § 237(a). Although the new proceedings retain
the old concepts of exclusion and deportation, the distinction between the two
removal proceedings revolves around the definition of"admission" rather than
4,entry. 9' 10 6
"Admission" is defined as "the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer."' 0 7
Previously, under the "entry" doctrine, "any coming of an alien into the
United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession"
was considered an entry, and thus, the alien who entered was entitled to more
discretionary relief and procedural due process in deportation hearings.' 8
Under the 1996 revisions to the INA, the alien must undergo inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer to be considered "admitted."' 9 This
104. O'Sullivan, supra note 24, at 255.
105. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 240(aX1), 8 U.S.C.A. 1229a (a) (1) (West
1998).
106. 8 U.S.C.A. I101 (a)(13).
107. 8 U.S.C.A. 1101 (a) (13) (A).
108. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), § 101(aXl3), 66 Stat. 167, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1 101(aX1 3) (1952), amended by, 8 U.S.C.A. § I 101(a)(1 3) (West 1998).
109. 8 U.S.C.A. § I l01(a)(13XA).
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prevents the alien who surreptitiously enters the United States from claiming
the benefits of a deportation hearing based on his physical presence in the
United States, regardless of his length of residency."0
Regarding the burden of proof, the new standards for determining
admissibility in removal proceedings are analogous to those previously
established in exclusion proceedings."' Generally, the alien has the burden
of proof.' However, the standard varies depending on whether the alien is
an applicant for admission subject to exclusion or an admitted alien facing
deportation." 3 If the alien is an applicant for admission subject to exclusion,
the alien must prove that he or she is "clearly and beyond a doubt" entitled to
admission and is not inadmissible under INA § 212."' If, however, the alien
establishes by "clear and convincing" evidence that he or she is not an alien
seeking admission and that there was a prior lawful admission, the alien is no
longer an "applicant for admission.""' s Thus, the burden shifts to the
government in cases of deportable aliens." ' When an alien previously
admitted is facing deportation, the INS has the burden of proving by "clear
and convincing" evidence that the alien is deportable.' '7 Again, the standard
is largely dependant upon the definition of "admission," and whether the alien
has been "admitted" prior to the determination of removability.
B. The Lawful Permanent Resident Alien Exception
The most ambiguous of the 1996 amendments are the exceptions for
permanent resident aliens. Prior to URIRA, the Act defined "entry" to exclude
a lawful permanent resident if "the alien proves to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying
possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his
presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not
110. Patrick, supra note 24, at 3.
111. O'Sullivan, supra note 24, at 256.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 256-57.
114. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 240(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(2)(A)
(West 1998).
115. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(2XB).
116. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
117. Id..
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voluntary .... t This language has been replaced by six categorical
exceptions to the rule that a permanent resident alien will not be regarded as
seeking admission in the United States."'
Although enacted to remove some of the ambiguities of the earlier entry
problem, the new amendments have created their own complexities. I will
discuss these complexities in Part IV of this article.
C. Additional Bars to Admissibility
IIR.RA added new bars to admissibility that have particularly strong
ramifications for lawful permanent resident aliens. These modifications are
"particularly wide-reaching and troublesome"'' 20  and reflect the anti-
immigration sentiment underlying the passage of this Act.' 2 1 Specifically,
INA § 212(a) was amended to prevent a category of previously removed aliens
from reentering the United States. In the 1996 amendment, Congress outlines
three types of previously removed aliens who are now inadmissible under
IIRIRA: certain aliens who were previously ordered removed, aliens who were
unlawfully present for significant periods of time, and aliens who were
unlawfully present after previous immigration violations. 22  The period of
118. § 101(aXI3),8 U.S.C.A. § I101(aX13).
119. § 101(aXI3)(C), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13)(C). The relevant passage reads as follows:
An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be
regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the
immigration laws unless the alien-
(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180
days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal
of the alien from the United States, including removal proceedings under this Act
and extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2) [8 U.S.C.A.
§ I1182(a)(2)], unless since such offense the alien has been granted relief under
section 212(h) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(h)] or 240A(a) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(a)], or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration
officers or has not been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorized
by an immigration officer.
120. Yost, supra note 101, at 593.
121. Slayton, supra note 87, at 1045.
122. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 182(a)(9) (West
1998).
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inadmissibility varies and depends upon the alien's status. The Act now
permits the INS to exclude (1) aliens who were previously removed due to an
act of misrepresentation under INA § 212(a)(6)(C) or who were previously
removed for a failure to comply with documentation requirements under INS
§ 212(a)(7) and (2) any aliens who are at the end of removal proceedings, for
a minimum period of five years, or permanently in the case of an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony.'23 An alien who has been ordered removed
or who departs the United States while an order of removal is outstanding, is
inadmissible for a minimum of ten years. 24 Additionally, aliens who are
unlawfully present"' in the United States for a period of more than 180 days,
but less than one year, and depart prior to commencement of removal
proceedings, are inadmissible for three years from the date of departure or
removal. 126 The period of inadmissibility increases to ten years if the alien is
unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. 127 Finally,
INA § 212(a)(9)(C) excludes any aliens who are unlawfully present in the
United States subsequent to a previous immigration violation.1
28
D. The New 'Aggravated Felony' Standard
Following the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 9 aggravated felons are permanently barred
from entering the United States.3 ° This is particularly noteworthy given the
expanded definition of "aggravated felony" in IIRIRA.' 3 ' Enacted on the one-
year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing,'32 "AEDPA was passed to
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. An alien is unlawfully present in the United States if the alien remains in the United States after
the expiration of an authorized stay or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.
8 U.S.C.A. § II 82(a)(9)(B)(ii).
126. 8 U.S.C.A. § I182(a)(9XBXi).
127. Id.
128. 8 U.S.C.A. § l182(aX9)(C)(i).
129. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, !10 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.)[hereinafter AEDPA].
130. AEDPA §440(a).
131. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)of 1952, § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(43) (West
1998).
132. On April 19, 1995, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City became the site of the
deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history, killing 169 men, women and children. At approximately 9:03 a.m.,
a truck bomb exploded in front of the building, blowing offthe front side of the nine-story federal building,
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'combat the force of domestic terrorism through legislation aimed at deterring
and preventing senseless acts of violence. "33
Not only was the definition of "aggravated felony" expanded to include
new crimes, 34 but it was also modified to include any crime for which the
term of imprisonment exceeds one year.'3 This lowers the previous threshold
of five years. 36 Additionally, the threshold for money laundering and other
illegal monetary transactions was reduced from $ 100,000 to $ 10,000, and the
threshold for tax evasion and fraud was reduced from $200,000 to $10,000.131
Furthermore, the retroactive application of this new amendment' 38 coupled
with INA § 23 7(a)(2)(A)(iii), allowing deportation of any alien convicted of
an aggravated felony after admission, subjects many unsuspecting longtime
permanent resident aliens to deportation. Individuals applying for
naturalization under the impression that they are eligible to become U.S.
citizens are haunted by their past conviction as they are directly confronted by
the retroactivity of the new law upon application, thereby rendering them
deportable. As a result, this has been criticized as one of the more unfair and
unnecessary aspects of the new law.'39 Imagine for example, a resident alien
who arrives in 1992, prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, is later convicted of
theft and sentenced to two years imprisonment, and subsequently released and
establishes a lifestyle similar to that of an American citizen. On March 3 1,
1996, he or she would not be an aggravated felon as the definition of
"aggravated felony" only includes a theft offense in which the term of
imprisonment is at least five years. The next day, however, IIRIRA goes into
collapsing floors and burying victims under masses of concrete and steel. E.g., Tony Clark, The Worst
Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil: April 19, 1995, at http://www.cnn.com/ US/OKC /daily/ 9512/ 12-30/
index.html (Dec. 30, 1995).
133. Sara Candioto, Note, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of]996: Implications
Arising from the Abolition of Judicial Review of Deportation Orders, 23 J. LEGIS. 159, 159 (1997). See
also id. at 393-94 (discussing the events triggering the enactment of AEDPA).
134. Id. at 394-95. As a result, certain crimes of violence, theft, burglary, racketeering, gambling
offenses, counterfeiting, document fraud, commercial bribery, forgery or trafficking in vehicles with altered
identification numbers, obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of a witness, are all classified as an
"aggravated felony" under immigration laws and are subject the perpetrator to permanent inadmissibility.
Yost, supra note 101, at 594 n.50 (emphasis added).
135. Yost, supra note 101, at 594.
136. 8 U.S.C.A. § I 101(a)(43).
137. 8 U.S.C.A. §I 101(a)(43).
138. Id.
139. Sara A. Martin, Note, Postcards from the Border: A Result-Oriented Analysis of Immigration
Reform Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 683, 695 (1999).
THE IIRIRA: ANOTHER HURDLE FOR THE COURTS
effect and the definition of "aggravated felony" is expanded to include a theft
offense resulting in at least one year of imprisonment. Suddenly, on April 1,
1997, the resident alien would be subject to deportation despite the fact that
his or her crime was not an "aggravated felony" at the time it was
committed. 0
E. Limitations on Discretionary Relief
Further limitations on the availability of discretionary relief under INA §
240A deprive permanent resident aliens of vested rights and subjects them to
harsh consequences.141 The new "cancellation of deportation" combines the
earlier INA § 244 "suspension of deportation" and INA § 212(c) waivers.
Unlike the earlier INA § 244 "suspension of deportation," however, the new
"cancellation of deportation" presents a less accommodating standard of
relief. Under INA § 244, the alien~who faced deportation could seek relief on
the basis that deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to the alien or
to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident who is the alien's spouse, parent or
child.142 Although this was a heavier burden of proof than INA § 212(c), the
alien was almost never barred from seeking relief on the basis of deportable
offenses. Similarly, under the then prevailing interpretation of INA § 212(c),
immigration judges were allowed to exercise discretion where removal of a
particular criminal alien may not have been appropriate. "' Careful
consideration was given to the individual circumstances of the alien who was
facing deportation. After balancing several factors established by the BIA, the
immigration judge would determine the alien's eligibility for waiver.'" After
the enactment of IIRIRA, however, aliens convicted of an aggravated felony
would first have to meet the statutory eligibility requirements and the
unforgiving "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard to obtain
relief."'
140. In other words, the prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply in the context of
deportation statutes. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 41, at 718. See also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
530-31 (1954) (holding that policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are
entrusted exclusively to Congress, and thus, the ex post facto clause has no application to deportation).
141. See Slayton, supra note 87, at 1046-47.
142. Martin, supra note 139, at 699-700.
143. Id. at699.
144. Id.
145. Id. at701.
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While it remains unclear with what degree of severity this
new standard will be enforced, its application will most likely
parallel its application under the old version of the INA for
serious offenses. Therefore, combining the previous [INA
§ §] 212(c) and 244(a) waivers into the single 'cancellation of
deportation' provision establishes an egregiously high
threshold.1
46
Again, this change to the Immigration and Nationality Act reflects the
harshness of IIRIRA and the limiting effect on the rights of permanent resident
aliens.
F. The Preclusion of Judicial Review
In the most significant of the 1996 amendments, Congress severely
restricted the availability of judicial review for certain aliens who face
deportation. 4 7 After stripping away the rights of these permanent resident
aliens, AEDPA and III1RA then limit access to judicial review, often
eliminating the aliens' only form of protection. This has been the topic of
much scholarly debate as academics and lawyers await the Court's
interpretation of the laws restricting federal court jurisdiction in immigration
cases.
Prior to the 1996 amendments, the federal courts of appeals were granted
jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of deportation.4 Likewise,
appeals for final orders of exclusion were initiated through a habeas corpus
petition in district court."4 9 Furthermore, if a collateral issue arose upon
review of a deportation order in a federal court of appeals, federal district
courts were given federal questionj urisdiction, habeas corpus jurisdiction, and
jurisdiction for all claims arising under the immigration laws.'
The 1996 enactment of AEDPA placed substantial limitations on the
146. Id.
147. David Cole, No Clear Statement: An Argument for Preserving Judicial Review of Removal
Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 427,429 (1998).
148. Id. at 428.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 429.
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judicial review of certain deportation orders: "Any final order of
deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of [certain
enumerated criminal grounds] shall not be subject to review by any court." ' "
Following the trend of AEDPA, IIRIRA went even further in restricting the
availability ofjudicial review in immigration matters. Not only are "criminal
aliens" denied access to judicial review for INS removal orders, but they are
also denied review for INS decisions that detain them pending removal.'53
Additionally, IIRIRA bars judicial review of all discretionary relief other than
asylum."" Finally, the most inclusive of these new restrictions is the "catch-
all" provision,'" granting the Attorney General exclusive jurisdiction in
decisions or actions regarding the commencement of proceedings, the
adjudication of cases, or the execution of removal orders against any aliens.'56
Read literally, these new provisions barring judicial review divest the
federal courts of their constitutional powers and intruding on their "essential
function.""' Using the "clear statement" rule, however, the Court has
interpreted these provisions to preserve some jurisdiction over immigration
matters.' The rule demands that statutes be read to preserve judicial review
of constitutional claims and of habeas corpus unless Congress expressly
forecloses such review.'59 Although the issue of judicial review has resulted
in an entire line of cases 6 ' and scholarly debate, the relevant question for my
discussion of the Fleuti doctrine is to what extent the federal judiciary, in light
of the 1996 changes, remains willing and able to confront the plenary powers
of Congress. In Part IV, I will discuss some of the recent judicial decisions
reflecting the changes made by AEDPA and IIRIRA. I will also demonstrate
the instability and inconclusiveness of these court determinations. Thus, in
Part V, I will conclude by discussing the future ramifications of these
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting AEDPA §§401(e), 440(a)).
153. Id. at429.
154. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § ! 252(a)(2)(B) (West
1998).
155. Slayton, supra note 87, at 1051.
156. 8 U.S.C.A. §1229a(a)(3).
157. Cole, supra note 147, at 431. Cole further argues that such a bar would be a violation of due
process as well as the Suspension Clause. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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congressional changes and the role of the judiciary in shaping this body of law
in light of the plenary power doctrine.
IV. POST-IIRIRA DECISIONS
A. In re Jesus Collado-Munoz
Following the passage of the 1996 Act, there seemed to be conflicting
sentiment as to whether the Fleuti doctrine was still applicable. In their
decision in In re Jesus Collado-Munoz, the BIA held that Congress effectively
eliminated the Fleuti doctrine when it supplanted the definition of "entry"
with definitions for "admission" and "admitted."'' The Board used the plain
language of the statute, legislative history, and the rationale of Fleuti to
support its conclusion.
Jesus Collado, a lawful permanent resident, had been in the United States
for more than twenty-five years.6 2 Upon returning to the United States from
a two week visit to his native country, the Dominican Republic, he was
charged with inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(2), based on a 1974
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor.63 When Collado first came to the
United States in 1972, at the age of seventeen, he was involved in a sexual
relationship with a girlfriend who was a minor." The girlfriend's mother
pressed criminal charges against Collado, who pled guilty to the crime of
sexual abuse in the second degree. 6 Then, his crime was not cause for
deportation.' Subsequently, upon his return in 1997, IIRIRA had been
passed, and he was subject to its retroactivity. 6 7 Thus, Collado was deemed
inadmissible for a single crime involving moral turpitude. 68
The issue on appeal was whether the Fleuti doctrine survived enactment
of JIRIRA, and whether Collado's departure fell within the "brief, casual, and
161. In re Collado-Munoz, Interim Decision No. 3333, 1997 BIA LEXIS 40 (B.I.A. Dec. 18, 1997),
at *10.
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id.
164. Morawetz, supra note 5, at 115.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 116.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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innocent" requirement of the exception.'69 If so, he would not be an alien
seeking admission, and would be entitled to greater due process protection in
the deportation hearing. Unfortunately, the Board rejected the application of
the doctrine, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine
Collado's excludability under INA § 212(a)(2)."'7 The Board's decision was
based on the plain meaning of the statute, legislative history, and the policy
considerations underlying the Fleuti decision. 7 '
First, the Board reasoned that the plain meaning of the required a finding
that it was written "to create a dichotomy."' The six exceptions specify
when a lawful permanent resident alien should be regarded as "seeking an
admission" without regard to whether the alien's departure was "brief, casual,
and innocent" under the Fleuti doctrine.'" According to the Board, the statute
established a general rule, always applicable unless a particular exception
stated otherwise.'74 It then specified six exceptions to the general rule, and
any lawful permanent resident alien fitting one of the six exceptions would be
deemed to be "seeking admission."'7 Prior to IIRIRA, the concept of
absences that were "brief, casual, and innocent" was incorporated into other
provisions of the Act.77 Now, INA § 240A(d) sets "special rules" for
continuous residence or physical presence in the United States. 7  When
Congress intended to preserve aspects of the Fleuti doctrine, it did so
specifically, as reflected by the statute.
Second, the Board acknowledged that the legislative history clearly
suggested that the amended definition was intended to preserve "a portion" of
the Fleuti doctrine.'78 However, it also noted that "this section intends to
overturn certain interpretations of Fleuti by stating that a returning lawful
permanent resident alien is seeking admission if the alien is attempting to
enter or has entered the United States without inspection... .,,'7' In effect,
169. In re Collado-Munoz. 1997 BIA LEXIS 40, at *4.
170. Id. at*13.
171. Id. at*8-*14.
172. Id. at *7-*8.
173. Id. at *12.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *8 n.2. See also Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 244(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1254(b)(2) (West 1998); INA§ 245A(aXZXB), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(a)(3)(B) (West 1998).
177. In re Collado-Munoz, 1997 BIA LEXIS 40, at *8 n.2.
178. Id. at *9 n.3.
179. Id. at *10 n.4 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. I at 225-26 (1996)).
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IIRIRA was enacted to restrict the Fleuti doctrine rather than to expand. 180
Finally, the Board asserted that its decision in Collado was consistent with
the policy considerations underlying Fleuti. The decision in Fleuti was based
on an interpretation of the terms "entry" and "intended." Since these words
no longer existed in the Act as amended by IIRIRA, it would not be
inconsistent to say that Fleuti did not survive the enactment of IIRIRA.'8 ' For
example, instead of using the "brief, casual, and innocent" standard, IRIRA
categorically treats any lawful permanent resident alien absent from the
United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days as an alien
"seeking admission.""8 2 Based on these considerations, the Board reversed the
Immigration Judge's decision to apply the Fleuti doctrine, and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion." 3
B. Richardson v. Reno
Although the result of In re Jesus Collado seemed to foreclose an avenue
of relief previously available to returning permanent resident aliens,
Richardson v. Reno'84 brought new hope. The district court in Richardson
came to an opposite conclusion, holding that "[i]t is evident from the plain
meaning of the statute, the legislative history, and the important policy
concerns that animated the Court in 1963 that Fleuti is still good law."' 5
Richardson was a native citizen of Haiti.8 6 Since 1968, he had resided in
the United States as a lawful permanent resident, eventually marrying a U.S.
citizen, fathering three children (all of whom were U.S. citizens) and
establishing a successful Cleaning business. 8 ' On October 26, 1997,
Richardson was detained by the INS at the Miami International Airport after
returning from a two day trip to Haiti with his family. 8 While detained,
180. Id. at *9 n.3.
181. Id. at*lO.
182. Id. at *11.
183. Id. at*14.
184. Richardson v. Reno, 994 F.Supp. 1466, 1472 (S. D. Fl. 1998), revd and vacated, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31009 (11 th Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn and substituted by 162 F.3d 1338 (11 th Cir. 1998),
reaff'din part, 180 F.3d 1311 (11 th Cir. 1999), rehearing en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11 th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1529 (2000).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1468.
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Richardson admitted to having two prior convictions.'89 On the basis of his
statements, he was deemed inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(2) because "he
was not 'clearly and beyond a doubt' entitled to be admitted to the United
States."' 90 He was held at the Krome Detention Center without opportunity
for release on bond, while the INS began its procedures for removal. 9'
On November 13, 1997, Richardson requested that the INS release him on
bond pending removal proceedings.'92 This request was denied, after which
Richardson filed a Motion for Bond Pending Deportation Proceedings with the
Office of the Immigration Judge.193 Again, his motion was denied without a
hearing. 94 At this point, Richardson filed a habeas corpus petition with the
federal district court, contesting the Immigration Judge's denial of his request
for a bond hearing. '95 Finding subject matter jurisdiction, the district court
held that the BIA's decision was not based on a permissible construction of
INA § 101 (a)(13) (C).9 6 On the contrary, the BIA interpretation destroyed the
plain meaning of the statute.'97 The federal district court construed the statute
to mandate only when a returning lawful permanent resident should not be
regarded as seeking admission. 98 If one of the six categorical exceptions to
INA § 101 (a)(13)(C) applied, the returning lawful, permanent resident could
not be regarded as "seeking admission."' 99 The statute did not mandate that
all other returning lawful permanent residents whose status fell outside the six
categorical exceptions be deemed to be "seeking admission."2" Rather, the
court said that the Fleuti test of "brief, casual, and innocent" should still be
applied to determine the returning permanent resident's status,2"' based on the
fact that Congress had not expressly rejected the court-created Fleuti
doctrine.0 2 In rejecting the BIA decision in In re Jesus Collado, the federal
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. .Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1470.
197. Id. at 1470-71.
198. Id. at 1471.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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district court looked to the plain meaning of the statute, legislative history,
and important policy considerations. The court held that under the deportation
laws, Richardson was entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge
because he was not "seeking admission" as defined in Fleuti.03 Again, the
courts recognized a heightened level of protection for those aliens with a
vested interest in the United States.
What seemed to be a victory for this class of unprotected individuals was
quickly overshadowed by yet another challenge to their constitutional rights.
This time, Congress' limitation on judicial review would have significant
ramifications, not only for Richardson, but for returning permanent residents
as a whole. The federal district court opinion was reversed and vacated by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on February 23, 1998 for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.2"4 No longer would time spent in the United States entitie
lawful permanent residents to a greater degree ofprotection. They were again
thrown in with the other new entry seekers and left with virtually no due
process rights. On rehearing, the court of appeals again declined to reach the
merits of the case. Instead, the court held that DIRIRA eliminated the court's
jurisdiction to hear Richardson's constitutional and statutory challenges.0 5
V. THE FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS OF IIRIRA AND THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY
Given the current state of uncertainty surrounding the Fleuti doctrine and
Congress' limitations on courts' power to review administrative decisions, the
203. Id.
204. Richardson v. Reno, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31009 (11 th Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn and
substituted by 162 F.3d 1338 (11 th Cir. 1998), "Application to Withdraw Court's Mandate and Stay or
Summarily Reverse its Decision" denied. 175 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, case remanded for
further consideration in light of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 US. 471 (1999),
526 U.S. 1142 (1999), reafd in part. 180 F.3d 1311 (1 lthCir. 1999),rehearingenbancdenied, 193 F.3d
525 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1529 (2000).
205. Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338, 1357 (11 th Cir. 1998), "Application to Withdraw Court's
Mandate and Stay or Summarily Reverse its Decision " denied, 175 F.3d 898 (11 th Cir. 1999), vacated,
case remandedforfurther consideration in light of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471 (1999), 526 U.S. 1142 (1999), reaff'd in part, 180 F.3d 1311 (11 th Cir. Fla. 1999), rehearing
en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied. 120 S.Ct. 1529 (2000). For a more detailed
discussion on the issues concerning judicial review raised by the case, see generally id. See also Reno v.
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THE IIRIRA: ANOTHER HURDLE FOR THE COURTS
beginning of the twenty-first century marks a turning point. The question
remains, will the U.S. Supreme Court dare to disavow the longstanding
plenary power doctrine, and openly recognize constitutional protections for
this category of noncitizens? Or will the echo of Yick Wo2te resonate
throughout the next century? The unfettered exercise of congressional powers
to establish immigration laws could lead to disastrous consequences. To
ensure that each branch retains its independence and ability to perform
essential functions, the judiciary must act to preserve its Article II function
of upholding the Constitution,2"' and according to Erwin Chemerinsky, "Due
process, of course, is at the very core of the judicial mission. 2 8 With the
enactment of LIRIRA, Congress exceeded its essential powers by foreclosing
all federal judicial review of immigration matters. As a result, the INS has the
sole authority to determine the substantive and procedural rights of certain
individuals residing in the United States.
To retain its central function, the U.S. Supreme Court should reject a strict
construction of the statute and use the "clear statement" rule to retain judicial
review of constitutional claims. The Court should further recognize the due
process rights of returning permanent resident aliens by affirming the Fleuti
doctrine, in light of the 1996 amendments, whether through subconstitutional
norms or through "real" constitutional norms. The action or inaction of the
federal judiciary during this juncture will be crucial to the shaping of
immigration law in the twenty-first century.
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Between 1882 and 1892, Congress enacted a series of "Chinese exclusion laws" which became the first
federal immigration statutes to be subjected tojudicial scrutiny. ALEINEIKOFF El AL.,supra note 41, at 179.
The origins of immigration case law are firmly rooted in the racist rhetoric surrounding Asian immigrants.
For further discussion on the history of this period see LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS AS HARSH AS TIGERS:
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